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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article summarizes major developments in intellectual prop-
erty (IP) law during the past year.1 While we focus on case law
that is precedential in the Fifth Circuit, we also review IP law de-
velopments that are likely to be influential in the evolution of Texas IP
jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal
Circuits. For developments in copyright and trademark law, the Fifth Cir-
cuit's authority is binding, but other circuits, such as the Second and the
Ninth, are considered highly persuasive. Because all cases concerning a
substantive issue of patent law are appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit,2 decisions from that court during the Survey pe-
riod are included in this article.
The U.S. Supreme Court was more active in the intellectual property
field during the Survey period than in recent years, which is to say that
the Court heard multiple cases that dealt with IP issues.3 While the Court
did not issue the industry shaking opinions that some anticipated, its deci-
sions do carry important implications. In patents, the Court considered
whether business methods should be patentable subject matter.4 In copy-
right, the Court decided whether it is necessary for a plaintiff to register a
work prior to filing an infringement action 5 and whether to apply copy-
right law's first sale doctrine to imported, foreign made goods.
6
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two key cases that in-
volve IP.7
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,
130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565, 565
(2010) (mem).
4. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
5. Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1241.
6. Costco, 131 S. Ct. at 565 (granting certiorari on appeal from Omega, S.A. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 982 (9th Cir. 2008)).
7. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458, 458 (2010) (mem.)
(granting certiorari on appeal from SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360,
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The Federal Circuit continued to be busy in the patent field. This Sur-
vey period saw the rise of false marking claims8 as well as a new and
expanded definition of who owes a duty of candor to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). 9 The court also ruled on whether the Patent
Act contains a written description requirement separate from its enable-
ment requirement. 10 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits issued important copy-
right decisions, including a decision that will significantly limit how
previously owned software may be sold.' Finally, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York made headlines more than once
during the Survey period ruling on whether human genes could be pat-
ented 12 and whether YouTube could be liable for the more than occa-
sional infringement of its users. a3  The Survey period therefore
encompasses a body of case law that merits review.
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. A Method to the Madness?-Bilski v. Kappos
The sole question before the Court in Bilski v. Kappos was whether the
Federal Circuit's "machine-or-transformation" test should be the exclu-
sive measure of whether a "process" is patentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.14 The reason Bilski became closely watched, however, was the
possibility that the Court would use the case to do away with business
method patents altogether. 15 The practice of granting a patent on a
method of doing business has been controversial since the Federal Circuit
cleared the way for such patents in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.16 That decision led to a flurry of patent applica-
tions for business methods, which members of the Court have criticized
for their vagueness. 17 Many scholars and legal practitioners believed that
Bilski would spell the end of the business method patent.' 8 In the end,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647, 647 (2010) (mem.)
(granting certiorari on appeal from i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
8. Brian Bowling, "False Marking" Suits Haunt Manufactures, PITrSBURG TRIBUNE
REVIEW, Dec. 19, 2010.
9. Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 973-74 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
10. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
11. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010).
12. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
13. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
14. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-27 (2010).
15. Scott M. Alter, Bi/ski v. Kappos: The Most Recent Event in an Ongoing Saga, IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Aug. 2010, at 10.
16. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
17. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting "[tihe potential vagueness and suspect validity of some ... [busi-
ness-method] patents").
18. Brad Stone, A Patent Ruling May Be Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at C5.
2011]
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the Court's decision in Bilski was as narrow as the question on appeal. 19
The Court found that the machine-or-transformation test is a "useful and
important clue" for analyzing patentability, but it "is not the sole test for
whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process."' 20 The Court declined
to categorically reject business methods as patentable subject matter.21
Bernard Bilski had sought to patent a method for hedging against risk
in energy trading.22 "The patent examiner rejected [Bilski's] application
on the ground that it. . . 'is not implemented on a specific apparatus and
that it merely manipulates [an] abstract idea . . . .'" The Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) affirmed.23 The Federal Circuit af-
firmed the BPAI's ruling, holding that the machine-or-transformation test
was the "sole test" for determining patent eligibility of a process under
§ 101.24 Under that test, an invention is a patentable process only if it
"(1) is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a par-
ticular article into a different state or thing."'2 5 Applying this test, the
court held that Bilski's method was not patent eligible.26
On appeal, Bilski argued that the machine-or-transformation test was
not the exclusive test for patentability of a method and that the Federal
Circuit should have considered other factors and other tests. 27 The gov-
ernment countered that Bilski's method comprised nothing more than an
abstract idea that could not be patented.28 The government also attacked
business method patents generally, arguing that the term "process" in
§ 101 is "limited to technological and industrial methods" and therefore
excludes business method patents as a category. 29
The Supreme Court agreed with Bilski that the machine-or-transforma-
tion test was not the sole means of assessing patentability of methods.30
The Court found that valid method claims may very well exist but not
satisfy the rigid requirements of that test. For example, Justice Kennedy
(joined by Justices Roberts, Alito, and Thomas) noted that "the machine-
or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of
software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based
on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital
19. D. C. Denison, Relief as Patent Process Left Intact: High Court Ruling Could Have
Altered Software Firms' Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2010, at Business 5.
20. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
21. Id. at 3228.
22. Id. at 3223.
23. Id. at 3233 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court rejected its prior test
for determining whether a claimed invention was a patentable "process" under § 101-
whether it produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result"-as articulated in State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998) and AT&T Corp.
v. Excel Comm'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (1999). In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 n.19.
25. Id. at 954.
26. Id. at 963-66.
27. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226-27.
28. Id. at 3223.
29. Id. at 3237.
30. Id. at 3227.
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signals. '31 The Court nevertheless found Bilski's method to be ineligible
for patent protection on the grounds that it constituted an abstract idea.
32
Importantly, the Court explicitly declined to reject business patents as a
category, finding that certain provisions of the Patent Act would be ren-
dered meaningless if business methods were unpatentable under any
circumstances.33
Four justices concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the major-
ity's decision not to end the practice of granting patents on business
methods.34 Justice Stevens wrote for this group that the Court should
have held that "a claim that merely describes a method of doing business
does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101."35 After chronicling the
evolution of patent protection from its English roots, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that "[a]lthough it may be difficult to define with precision what is
a patentable 'process' under § 101, the historical clues converge on one
conclusion: A business method is not a 'process." 36
Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize the points upon which
the justices agreed: (1) that "although the text of § 101 is broad, it is not
without limit," (2) that the machine-or-transformation test continues to
be helpful in determining what is a patentable process, (3) that that test
has never been the sole test for making this determination, and (4) that
"although the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test for pat-
entability, this by no means indicates that anything which produces a
'useful, concrete, and tangible result' is patentable. '37
After Bilski, it is clear that reports of the death of business patents
were greatly exaggerated. 38 Yet the unanimous verdict should not be
taken as evidence that the issue is entirely settled. Although the Court's
opinion issued without dissent, the Court was narrowly divided on the
fundamental issue of whether business methods should be patentable,
and the legal community is similarly divided. Patent reform, or even a
future decision from the Court, could yet send business method patents
to their grave. In the near term, Justice Breyer's points of consensus may
guide how courts apply the machine-or-transformation test.39
2. Certiorari Granted-SEB, SA. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. and i4i
Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), whoever "actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer."'40 In SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3229-30.
33. Id. at 3228-29.
34. Id. at 3232.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3249-50.
37. Id. at 3258-59 (quoting State Str. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed Cir. 1998)).
38. Id. at 3228.
39. Id. at 3258-59.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
20111
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Ward & Co., the Federal Circuit considered the level of knowledge that
the alleged inducer must have to be liable under this statute. 41 Federal
Circuit precedent suggested that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the existence of the patent at issue in order to
succeed in an inducement claim.42 In SEB, the Federal Circuit clarified
that a defendant's deliberate disregard of the risk that a patent exists can
satisfy the actual knowledge requirement of an inducement claim.43
Under SEB, a plaintiff must prove only that the defendant acted with
"deliberate indifference" to potential patent rights.44 In October 2010,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 45 The Court will consider whether
the legal standard for the state of mind element of induced infringement
under § 271(b) is "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that infringe-
ment may occur or "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" to en-
courage an infringement.46 The outcome will determine the level of care
companies must use in bringing their products to market.
In i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., an Eastern District of Texas
jury found that Microsoft willfully infringed i4i's software patent by in-
corporating i4i's patented technology into versions of Microsoft Word.47
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Microsoft argued that i4i's patent was
anticipated by prior art that the PTO had not considered. 48 Because the
PTO granted the patent with incomplete knowledge of the prior art,
Microsoft argued that it should be required to prove invalidity merely by
"a preponderance of the evidence" rather than by the more stringent
"clear and convincing" standard.49  The Federal Circuit rejected
Microsoft's argument for the less stringent standard and affirmed the trial
court's $240 million judgment against Microsoft. 50
In November 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to take up
the question of whether a patent must be proved invalid by clear and
convincing evidence, regardless of whether the allegedly invalidating
prior art was considered by the PTO in granting the patent.51
If the Court adopts Microsoft's argument, it will hold that invalidity
can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence if the prior art that is
offered to prove invalidity was not considered by the PTO in granting the
41. SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
42. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc)
("The requirement that the alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions would
induce actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the
patent.").
43. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376-77.
44. Id.
45. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458, 458 (2010) (mem.).
46. Compare SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360,1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
2010), with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005).
47. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
48. Id. at 844, 848.
49. Id. at 848.
50. Id. at 839, 848, 864.
51. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647, 647 (2010) (mem.).
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patent.52 Such a ruling would raise a number of issues that may impact
patent prosecution practice. For example, would a patentee trigger the
clear and convincing standard by submitting a prior art reference to the
PTO during prosecution of the patent, regardless of whether the PTO
expressly considered the reference? Similarly, would the clear and con-
vincing standard apply to a reference submitted with a request for reex-
amination if the PTO determines that it does not raise a substantial new
question of patentability and denies the request? Undoubtedly, if the
Court adopts the preponderance standard proposed by Microsoft, the ef-
fects will extend beyond patent litigation.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Pandora's (Falsely Marked) Box- Forest Group, Inc., Brooks
Brothers, Inc., and Solo Cup Co.
When the Survey period began, only a couple of dozen false marking
suits were pending in federal court. 53 At the end of the Survey period,
the number was higher than 600 and rising quickly. 54 What happened in
between is a lesson in statutory interpretation and plaintiff opportunism.
The federal ban on false patent marking appears in § 292 of the Patent
Act, a qui tam statute, that states: "Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or
uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word
'patent' or any word or number importing that the same is patented for
the purpose of deceiving the public ... [s]hall be fined not more than
$500 for every such offense. '55
The statute adds that "any person" may sue under this statute, and it
provides that all penalties paid shall be shared equally between the per-
son suing (the "relator") and the United States government. 56
Prior to Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., most courts applied § 292
on a per-episode basis-that is, the courts imposed a single fine for the
false marking of multiple articles. 57 Recognizing that a maximum fine of
$500 per episode was a weak deterrent, other courts departed from the
language of the statute and took a time-based approach, issuing fines for
each day or week that an article was falsely marked.58 In Forest Group,
the Federal Circuit found that neither of these approaches was consistent
52. See i4i, 598 F.3d at 848.
53. Bowling, supra note 8.
54. Id.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006). Qui tam is a Latin term that means "Who sues on be-
half of the King as well as for himself." Qui tam statutes give standing to members of the
general public to sue for enforcement of the statutes, even absent evidence of harm to
them individually. The qui tam plaintiff, also known as a "relator," is permitted to recover
a portion of any fines imposed upon the defendant, in accordance with the statute. Federal
law includes only a few qui tam statutes-the false marking patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292;
the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733; and the Indian protection provisions of 25
U.S.C. § 201.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a).




with the plain language of § 292. 59 The court concluded, "Section 292
clearly requires a per-article fine."'60 The court did add that $500 was an
upper limit and that courts should reduce the amount to correspond to
the value of the falsely marked article. 6 '
Even with this limitation, the Forest Group decision sparked an explo-
sion in the number of false marking suits nationwide.62 It was a false
marking gold rush, with patent attorneys as well as laypeople scrutinizing
goods of all kinds, searching for expired or incorrect patent markings.63
The per-article calculation could lead to fines of staggering size, and the
statute stated that any person can bring a false marking claim and recover
half of the fine imposed.64 The Federal Circuit added fuel to the false
marking fire with its decision in Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.65 In that
case, the court held that private citizens and entities do indeed have
standing to bring false marking claims under § 292.66 The decision re-
moved a potential procedural obstacle to the hundreds of false marking
suits already pending in federal court and cleared the way for additional
future suits. 67
The Federal Circuit did place an important limitation on false marking
suits during the Survey term with its decision in Pequignot v. Solo Cup
Co.68 In that case, the court articulated the standard a plaintiff must
meet in order to prove that a defendant acted "for the purpose of deceiv-
ing the public" under § 292.69 The suit concerned Solo's marking of ap-
proximately 21.8 billion plastic cup lids.70 Solo stamped the lids with the
numbers of patents that had been valid when the manufacturing molds
were created but that had since expired. 71 Solo knew that the patents
were expired, and the company had adopted a policy to phase out the
incorrectly marked manufacturing molds as they wore out.72 However,
Solo continued to make lids stamped with the expired patent numbers in
the meantime.73 The plaintiff sought $500 for each falsely marked arti-
cle-a total fine of about $10.8 trillion.74 The court held that products
whose patents had expired were indeed "unpatented articles" under
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1304.
62. Bowling, supra note 8.
63. Dionne Searcey, New Breed of Patent Claim Bedevils Product Makers, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 1, 2010, at Al.
64. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006).
65. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
66. Id.
67. Searcey, supra note 63, at Al.
68. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (2010).
69. Id. at 1362-65.
70. Id. at 1359.
71. Id. at 1358-59.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1359.
74. Id. The court dryly observed in a footnote that the government's portion of the




§ 292.75 However, the court also held that Solo's knowledge of the ex-
pired patent created only a rebuttable presumption that it acted with a
purpose of deceiving the public under the statute. 76 Solo could rebut that
presumption if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that it
did not act with a purpose to deceive. 77 The court found that because
Solo acted on the advice of counsel, adopted a plan to phase out the
falsely marked molds, and had begun to implement that plan, the com-
pany successfully rebutted the presumption of purpose to deceive.78 The
Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Solo's favor.79
We expect to see significant developments in false marking law in 2011
and 2012. The Federal Circuit suggested in Brooks Brothers, that § 292
could be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.80 An amicus brief filed in
that case argued that § 292's qui tam provision, which allows "any per-
son" to sue to enforce the statute, gives the government insufficient con-
trol over the law's enforcement and thus violates the "take care" clause
of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. 81 The court described these
arguments as "relevant points" but declined to rule on them because the
constitutionality of § 292 was not raised on appeal.82 The Federal Circuit
also appears poised to decide whether a false marking claim is an allega-
tion of fraud that must meet the heightened pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).83 In Simonian v. BP Lubricants
USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit is considering a petition for a writ of man-
damus in which BP argues for the application of that heightened pleading
standard.84 Interestingly, the United States has filed an amicus brief in
that case supporting of BP and the heightened standard. 85 The current
state of law suggests that some form of judicial or legislative limitation is
likely in the coming months.
75. Id. at 1361.
76. Id. at 1362-63.
77. Id. at 1364.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1365.
80. See Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d at 1327.
81. Id. (summarizing amicus briefs argument that with 35 U.S.C. § 292, "Congress has
stripped the executive branch of its duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'
by giving such power to the public," and contrasting § 292 with the False Claims Act's
imposition of numerous controls on qui tam relators).
82. Id.
83. See Notice of Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, Simonian v. BP Lubricants USA Inc.,
No. 1-10-CV-01258 (N.D. I11. Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.falsemarking.net/cases/
1-10-cv-0125865/Order%20Granting%20Motion%2Oto%2OStay%2OPending%200utcome
%20of%20Mandamus%20Petition.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
84. See id.
85. See Response of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
In re BP Lubricants USA, Inc., Misc. Docket No. 2010-960 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2010), at 2,
available at http://www.falsemarking.net/casestfedbplResponse%20of%20U%20U%20A




2. A Not-So-Extraordinary Writ-Mandamus in the Eastern District of
Texas
As we have discussed previously in last year's Survey, the writ of man-
damus is no longer the extraordinary writ that it once was in the Eastern
District of Texas.8 6 This transformation became even more evident
throughout the Survey period. Six times between December 2009 and
January 2011, the Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus in cases aris-
ing in the Eastern District of Texas. 87 In each case the Federal Circuit
ordered the district court to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Despite noting in In re Nintendo that such writs are used only
in "extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usur-
pation of judicial power,"'8 8 the Federal Circuit repeatedly issued the
writs in the months that followed. The Federal Circuit continues to seem
inclined to mandate transfer of venue under § 1404(a) absent a concrete
connection between the Eastern District of Texas and a party, a witness,
or the evidence, regardless of whether the district is geographically cen-
trally located.89
Mandamus has become so commonplace in the Eastern District of
Texas that it is now simpler to discuss venue in terms of what will not
trigger mandamus relief there. In two notable cases, the Federal Circuit
declined mandamus relief to defendants seeking transfer out of the East-
ern District of Texas.90 In In re Wyeth, the Federal Circuit denied manda-
mus where the defendant had waited seventeen months before filing a
motion to transfer venue.91 The court held that Wyeth had not moved to
transfer venue with the "reasonable promptness" that the Fifth Circuit
requires, and that Wyeth had provided an insufficient excuse for the de-
lay.92 Another notable exception was In re Apple.93 In that case, the
district court had denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue on the
grounds that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating
that their proposed forum was "clearly more convenient" than the East-
ern District of Texas for trial.94 The Federal Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, acknowledged that the parties' ties to Texas were "recent and
ephemeral. ' 95 But the court also found that the defendants had not
86. See David L. McCombs, et al., Intellectual Property Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 653, 658
(2010).
87. In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Acer America
Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nintendo, 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffman-La
Roche, 587 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
88. In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d at 1197.
89. Id. at 1199-1200.
90. See In re Wyeth, 406 F. App'x 475, 476 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Apple, Inc., 374 F.
App'x 997, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (not designated for publication).
91. In re Wyeth, 406 F. App'x at 475.
92. Id. (citing Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989)).
93. In re Apple, 374 F. App'x at 999.
94. Id. at 998.
95. Id. at 999.
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made a compelling showing that Massachusetts was a more convenient
forum.96 The court denied the petition and declined to issue the writ.
97
The decision demonstrates that in a motion to transfer venue, it is not
enough for a defendant to show that the original forum is inconvenient.
98
The defendant must also provide a credible alternative. 99
3. Descriptive or Doomed-Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly
and Co.
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., the Federal Circuit,
en banc, considered whether the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 con-
tains a written description requirement separate from its enablement re-
quirement. 1°° Section 112 states that the patent specification "shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it. . . ."10l Ariad argued that the statute
requires only a single description-one that both describes the invention
and enables one of skill in the art to make and use it.102 The Federal
Circuit rejected this interpretation and reaffirmed its previous holdings
that two distinct descriptions are required-one that describes the inven-
tion such that one of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand
that "the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the
filing date," and another that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to
make and use it without undue experimentation. 10 3
Ariad's patents were based on the discovery of transcription factor NF-
kB and the recognition that reducing NF-kB activity could reduce the
negative effects of certain diseases. 104 The patents were of the kind that
universities and other research institutions often seek in order to lay
claim to the initial results of their basic research.' 0 5 Twenty-five amicus
briefs were filed in the case, and many of them argued that to require a
separate detailed written description of an invention would severely limit
patent protection for the fruits of basic scientific research and undermine
these institutions' incentive to innovate. 10 6 The court found Ariad's pat-
ents contained generic claims that defined the boundaries of a genus of
chemical compounds that can achieve a desired result, but they failed to





100. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed, Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
102. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1342.
103. Id. at 1351.
104. Id. at 1340. In molecular biology, a transcription factor is a protein that binds to
specific DNA sequences and thereby controls the movement (or transcription) of genetic
information from DNA to mRNA.
105. Id. at 1353.
106. Id. at 1338-39.
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plishes the result. 107 The court brushed aside concerns about stifling ba-
sic scientific research, stating that the patent law has always been directed
to the useful arts and that "[r]equiring a written description of the inven-
tion limits patent protection to those who actually perform the difficult
work of 'invention'-that is, conceive of the complete and final invention
with all its claimed limitations-and disclose the fruits of that effort to the
public.'1 0 8
4. An Industry Standard Shortcut-Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc.
In Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered whether
it was proper for the district court to use evidence of compliance with an
industry standard as a proxy for actual evidence of infringement.10 9 The
court held that a "district court may rely on an industry standard in ana-
lyzing infringement" only if the "court construes the [patent] claims and
finds that the reach of the claims includes any device that practices [the]
standard."" 0 An accused infringer then "is free to either prove that the
claims do not cover all implementations of the standard or to prove that it
does not practice the standard." '
The patent at issue claimed a method of sending wireless messages by
fragmenting the data in a particular way." 2 Philips Corporation (one of
the plaintiffs) argued that any product that complied with certain sections
of the IEEE 802.11 interoperability standard necessarily infringed the as-
serted claims. 113 Philips argued that Netgear indirectly infringed its pat-
ents by selling products that were compliant with the standard because
end users inevitably would use the products in a way that infringed."14
Netgear responded that Philips's patent claimed a process that relied on
technology that was optional under the IEEE 802.1 standard, and there-
fore, general compliance with the standard did not necessarily amount to
infringement. 15 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that even though
compliance with an industry standard will indicate infringement in some
instances, if "the relevant section of the standard is optional, [then] stan-
dards compliance alone would not establish [infringement]." 1 6 "In these
cases, the patent owner must compare the claims to the accused products
or, if appropriate, prove that the accused products implement any rele-
vant optional sections of the standard."" 7
107. Id. at 1350.
108. Id. at 1353.
109. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
110. Id. at 1327-28.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1326.
113. Id. at 1331.
114. Id. at 1328, 1330-31.
115. Id. at 1328-29, 1331.
116. Id. at 1327-28.
117. Id. at 1328.
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5. Anticompetitive Perhaps, but Not Misuse-Princo Corp. v.
International Trade Commission (ITC)
In Princo Corp. v. ITC, an en banc Federal Circuit considered the
scope of patent misuse, which can be asserted as a defense to claims of
patent infringement.' 18 The court considered the question: "When a pat-
entee offers to license a patent, does the patentee misuse that patent by
inducing a third party not to license its separate, competitive technol-
ogy?"'119 The court construed the doctrine of patent misuse narrowly and
found no misuse in the circumstances before it.120
Sony and Philips had collaborated to develop a standard for the manu-
facture of writable compact discs. 121 Initially, the companies proposed
different methods for how to encode position information in the disc so
that a consumer's CD reader/writer could maintain proper positioning
while writing data to the disc.' 22 Ultimately, engineers for both compa-
nies agreed that Philips's proposed method was most effective and the
companies agreed to use that method.'2 3 Philips assembled a pool of pat-
ents that would be necessary to make CDs under the new standard.' 24
Philips licensed the patents in the pool to companies that were interested
in producing rewritable CDs.' 25 Princo initially licensed the pooled pat-
ents but failed to pay royalties under the license. 126 After Philips brought
suit against Princo for infringement, Princo argued that Philips could not
enforce its patent because, by conspiring with Sony to suppress Sony's
competing technology, Philips had engaged in patent misuse.' 27 The Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the ITC's findings that Princo failed to demonstrate
that Philips committed patent misuse.' 28 The court explained that
"[w]hat patent misuse is about, in short, is 'patent leverage,' i.e., the use
of the patent power to impose overbroad conditions on the use of the
patent in suit that are 'not within the reach of the monopoly granted by
the Government."' 29 The court further explained that this "leverage"
test requires a connection between the patent in suit and the allegedly
misused patent. 130 The court found that Philips's and Sony's agreement
did not impermissibly leverage the patent.' 3' The court also noted that
the patent that Princo accused Philips of misusing was not one of the
patents it stood accused of infringing, and thus a connection between the
118. Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
119. Id. at 1331.
120. Id. at 1332, 1334





126. Id. at 1323.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1332.
129. Id. at 1331.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1333.
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patent in suit and the allegedly misused patent was lacking.132
6. Candor at the PTO-Avid Identification System, Inc. v. Crystal
Import Corp.
In Avid Identification System, Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., the Federal
Circuit defined who owes a duty of candor to the PTO during the prose-
cution of a patent application.' 33 PTO Rule 56 imposes a duty of candor
and good faith in dealing with the PTO upon "each individual associated
with the filing and prosecution of a patent application. '1 34 The rule de-
fines individuals associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application as (1) each named inventor, (2) each attorney or agent that
prepares or prosecutes the application, and (3) every other person who is
"substantively involved" in the preparation or prosecution of the applica-
tion and who is associated with the inventor or assignee. 135
Prior to this case, the Federal Circuit had not defined the scope of the
third category - those who are "substantively involved" in preparing or
prosecuting the application. 136 In Avid, the court held this to mean that
"the involvement relates to the content of the application or decisions
related thereto, and that the involvement is not wholly administrative or
secretarial in nature."'137 The court found that Avid's president, Dr. Han-
nis Stoddard-though not an attorney, agent, or inventor-was suffi-
ciently involved in the prosecution of the patent at issue so that he owed
a duty of candor to the PTO.138
Avid owned a patent on a radio frequency chip and reader system that
would help reunite owners with their lost pets by storing identifying infor-
mation on an implantable chip that could be read by animal shelters and
hospitals. 139 More than one year before the patent application was filed,
Dr. Stoddard demonstrated the technology at a livestock trade show.14
Dr. Stoddard did not disclose this public demonstration to the PTO. 14 1
Several years after the patent issued, Avid sued Crystal and other com-
petitors for infringement of the patent and obtained a jury verdict for
infringement and unfair competition. 42 Crystal asked the district court
to set aside the verdict, arguing that Avid's patent was unenforceable due
to Dr. Stoddard's inequitable conduct in failing to report the public dem-
onstration.' 43 The district court agreed, finding that Avid acted with in-
132. Id.
133. Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
134. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010).
135. Avid, 603 F.3d at 973 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2010)).
136. Id. at 974.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 976-77.
139. Id. at 969-70.






tent to deceive and that Dr. Stoddard was "substantively involved" in the
prosecution of the patent application. 144 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal.145 The court noted that the functionality of the
patented system was Dr. Stoddard's idea and that the inventors he hired
were specifically instructed to reduce his idea to practice. 14 6 The court
remarked that "to accept Avid's argument that a person such as Dr. Stod-
dard owes no duty of candor would allow intentional deception by the
types of people most likely to have knowledge of § 102(b) prior art, i.e.,
those on the commercial side of patented product development. '147
7. These Genes Are Not for Sale-Association for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO
Perhaps no patent case garnered more headlines during the Survey pe-
riod than Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).1 48 The
issue before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York was whether isolated human genes and the comparison of their se-
quences are patentable.149 The seven patents at issue claimed human
genes associated with breast and ovarian cancer and methods for de-
tecting mutations in those genes.1 50 Judge Robert W. Sweet ruled that
the human genes and the methods of detecting mutations in those genes
are unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.151 Myriad Genet-
ics, which owned the patents, appealed to the Federal Circuit. The appeal
squarely presents the question of whether human genes-whether in syn-
thetic form or isolated and purified-are patentable subject matter. The
United States has filed an amicus brief in support of neither party.' 52 The
government agrees with Myriad that the district court erred in holding
that synthetic versions of naturally occurring DNA molecules were unpat-
entable,153 but the government also agrees with Judge Sweet that isolated
and purified DNA molecules are unpatentable. 154 However the case is
decided, the Federal Circuit's decision will have far-reaching effects on
the biotechnology industry.155 An estimated twenty percent of the
144. Id. at 974.
145. Id. at 977.
146. Id. at 976.
147. Id.
148. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
149. Id. at 185
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 1, Ass'n
for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 2010 WL 3275970 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2010) (No. 2010-
1406), 2010 WL 5311466.
153. Id. at 14-16.
154. Id. at 32-36.
155. John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent, N.Y.




human genome is patented with billions of dollars invested in the pat-
ented technology. 56
8. Queuing Up for Attorneys' Fees-Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix,
Inc.
In Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., a case now on appeal, the Fed-
eral Circuit will decide what a defendant must prove in order to recover
attorneys' fees after prevailing in a patent infringement suit.157 Under 35
U.S.C. § 285, a "court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attor-
ney fees to the prevailing party. ' 158 The statute does not define the "ex-
ceptional" case, but numerous Federal Circuit decisions have attempted
to do so.15 9 In Media Queue v. Netflix, Netflix was the defendant and
prevailed in the district.160 Netflix sought attorneys' fees, but the district
court denied them. 161 On appeal, Netflix argues that a prevailing defen-
dant should more easily be able to prove exceptionality under § 285 and
recover attorneys' fees from the plaintiff.162
Federal Circuit precedent defines what constitutes an exceptional
case.163 A plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees if it can prove, for exam-
ple, that the defendant willfully infringed and willful infringement is an
objective standard to which the infringer's subjective "state of mind" is
irrelevant.1 64 Meanwhile, to recover attorneys' fees, a defendant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's claims were
objectively baseless and were brought in subjective bad faith. 65 On ap-
peal, Netflix argues that the Federal Circuit's standard for defendants is
more stringent than for plaintiffs, that Federal Circuit precedent conflicts
with the more egalitarian approach the Supreme Court has adopted in
the copyright context, and that the standard for defendants in patent in-
fringement suits should not be so exacting.' 66 As an alternative standard,
Netflix argues that accused infringers should be able to recover attorneys'
fees if they can show that the patentee was "objectively reckless" in filing
or pursuing a lawsuit or that the accused infringer "vindicated an impor-
156. Id.
157. Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44485, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2010).
159. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
160. Media Queue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44485, at *3-4.
161. Id. at *9.
162. Appellate Petition, Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., (Nos. 2010-1199, 2010-
1344), 2010 WL 2865955, at*2-6 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2010).
163. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, 892 F.2d at 1551.
164. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (acknowledging willfulness as grounds for an exceptional case determination); In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating what consti-
tutes willfulness).
165. See Wedgetail, Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
166. Appellate Petition, Media Queue, 2010 WL 2865955, at *2-6.
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tant public interest" by successfully invalidating patents that should not
have been granted in the first place.1 67 The Federal Circuit declined to
hear the case directly en banc, but a panel will consider the case in the
near future. 168
III. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON COPYRIGHT
1. Failure to Register-Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick
In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, the Supreme Court considered
whether the requirement that plaintiffs register their works prior to
bringing a claim for copyright infringement was a jurisdictional require-
ment that, if unmet, deprived a federal court of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.169 The Court overruled the Second Circuit and held that the
registration requirement in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is not jurisdictional-a
court may have subject-matter jurisdiction over a copyright infringement
action even if the works at issue were unregistered at the time the suit
was filed. 170
"The Muchnick case involved a class action by freelance authors and
trade groups asserting claims of copyright infringement related to the
electronic reproduction of works in which the authors retained copyright
ownership."'1 71 The named plaintiffs and many members of the class had
registered their works, but some class members had not done so. 172 The
Second Circuit had found that § 411(a)'s registration requirement was ju-
risdictional and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the class
action. 173 The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting § 411(a) to be
merely a procedural prerequisite to suit, but not one that deprived the
court of jurisdiction.174 Notably, the Court did not explain what effect
the failure to register a copyrighted work should have on a case, leaving
that task to other courts in future cases. 175
2. First Sale Doctrine-Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A
In Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the first sale doctrine should apply to copy-
167. Id. at *12-13.
168. Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21190, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 15, 2010) (denying rehearing enbanc).
169. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1242 (2010).
170. Id. at 1241.
171. Jason Bloom, Skip the Copyright Office and Proceed Directly to Suit?, HAYNES
AND BOONE, 1 (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.techlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/
HayBoo-Skip-the-Copyright-Office-and-Proceed-Directly-to-Suit.pdf.
172. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1242.
173. In re Literary Works in Electronic databases Copyright Litigation, 509 F.3d 116,
122 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
174. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1247, 1249.
175. See id. at 1249 ("We also decline to address whether § 411(a)'s registration re-
quirement is a mandatory precondition to suit .... ").
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righted articles purchased abroad and later imported into the United
States.176 Under the first sale doctrine, a purchaser of a copyrighted
work (such as a book or a poster) may later sell that work without the
permission of the copyright owner.177 The Ninth Circuit had held that
the first sale doctrine did not apply to goods manufactured and sold
abroad, and the Court granted certiorari to decide the issue. 178 In a 4-4
split without an opinion, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach. 179 Of course, because the Court was evenly divided, the case will
not be considered precedential.
The case concerned a shipment of watches that had been manufactured
by Omega in Switzerland, purchased by a Costco buyer in Latin America,
imported into the United States, and offered for sale.180 On the back of
the watches appeared a small copyrighted design and Omega claimed
that the unauthorized importation and distribution of the watches was
copyright infringement.' 81 If the watches had been made and sold in the
United States, Omega's rights in the work would have been exhausted
under the first sale doctrine, and Costco would be free to sell them.
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the foreign manufacture and sale of
the watches did not exhaust Omega's copyright.' 82 The court held that to
extend the first sale doctrine to such goods would "impermissibly apply
the Copyright Act extraterritorially.' 83 Following the Supreme Court's
non-decision, the law in the Ninth Circuit continues to be that the first
sale doctrine does not apply to goods manufactured and sold abroad. 184
B. THE CIRCUIT COURTS ON COPYRIGHT
1. Helpful to Hackers?-MGE UPS System, Inc. v. GE Consumer &
Industry Inc.
In MGE UPS System Inc. v. GE, the Fifth Circuit limited the scope of
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA).185 Under the DMCA, "No person shall circumvent a tech-
nological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title. ' 186 In this case, MGE argued that GE should be liable
under the DMCA because GE allegedly used MGE's copyrighted work
176. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010) (order granting
cert.); see also Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
177. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
178. Costco Wholesale Corp., 130 S. Ct. at 2089; Omega, 541 F.3d at 988.
179. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565, 565 (2010).
180. Omega, 541 F.3d at 983-84.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 990.
183. Id. at 988.
184. See id. at 986 (stating the first sale doctrine "grants first sale protection only to
copies legally made and sold in the United States").
185. MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus. Inc., 622 F.3d. 361, 366 (5th Cir.
2010).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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that at one time had been protected by anti-circumvention measures. 187
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that a party could not be liable for
circumvention under the DMCA without evidence of actual
circumvention. 188
MGE manufactured backup power supplies that provide uninterrupted
power in the event of an outage.'8 9 MGE also developed software to
service its power supplies. The software could be fully activated only with
a security dongle that had to be attached to the serial port of a techni-
cian's laptop computer. A GE subsidiary called PMI was a competitor to
MGE, and at some point PMI acquired a computer with MGE's proprie-
tary software.190 The computer had been "hacked" so that no security
dongle was required. MGE argued that PMI should be liable under the
anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA. 191 It argued that even if it
could not prove that PMI had circumvented the dongle, PMI nevertheless
should be liable under the DMCA for having used copyrighted software
after the dongle had been circumvented. 192 The Fifth Circuit rejected
such a broad application of the DMCA, explaining that "[s]o broad a
construction would extend the DMCA beyond its intended purposes to
reach extensive conduct already well-regulated by existing copyright
laws."'1 93 The court agreed with GE that absent a showing of circumven-
tion, GE was, at most, liable for copyright infringement for its use of the
software.'9 4 The decision narrows the scope of the DMCA's anti-circum-
vention provisions considerably, suggesting that hackers must be caught
in the act of circumvention if they are to be found liable under the anti-
circumvention measures of the DMCA.
2. One Less Thing You Can Buy on eBay-Vernor v. Autodesk
If MGE was a boon for hackers, Vernor v. Autodesk may come to be
seen as a windfall for software developers. 95 In Vernor, the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered whether a software owner could style the software's end
user license agreement (EULA) so that it prohibited future sales of the
software. 196 The issue, in effect, was whether software copyright owners
could avoid the first sale doctrine by licensing a copy of the software
rather than selling it. The Ninth Circuit held that the terms of the EULA
were permissible, that Autodesk's customers were licensees rather than
owners of the software, and that the first sale doctrine therefore did not
apply.197
187. MGE, 622 F.3d at 364.
188. Id. at 366.
189. Id. at 364.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 365.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 366.
194. Id.
195. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
196. Id. at 1107.
197. Id. at 1103-04.
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Autodesk makes computer-aided design software used by architects,
engineers, and manufacturers. 198 Autodesk released the software under
an EULA that the customer must accept before installing the software.
The EULA in this case specified, among other things, that (1) Autodesk
retains title to all copies; (2) the customer has a nonexclusive, nontrans-
ferable license; and (3) the customer is prohibited from renting, leasing,
or transferring the copy without Autodesk's permission. 199 Timothy Ver-
nor acquired several used copies of Autodesk's Release 14 and sold some
of them on eBay.200 Autodesk advised Vernor of the terms of the EULA
and asked Vernor not to sell additional copies of the software. Vernor
brought a declaratory judgment action, and the district court held that
under the first sale doctrine that Vernor was free to resell the software. 20 1
On appeal, Autodesk argued that the EULA was a valid contract, and
that under its terms, Autodesk customers were licensees who were bound
to abide by the terms of the license.20 2 The Ninth Circuit agreed and held
that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where
the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2)
significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3)
imposes notable use restrictions.20 3 The court found that "[b]ecause Ver-
nor did not purchase the Release 14 copies from an owner, he may not
invoke the first sale doctrine. '20 4
Perhaps the most immediate effect of this case will be that eBay
merchants will be more wary about the software they buy and resell. An-
other effect will be that software developers will begin to craft EULAs
that meet the Ninth Circuit's three criteria. Yet for many software devel-
opers, the EULAs they already use may suffice. The lower court's deci-
sion in Autodesk is an example of how software EULAs can be much
more restrictive on paper than courts ultimately interpret them to be.2 5
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Autodesk, software companies will
have greater confidence that courts will honor the terms of a restrictive
EULA.20 6
3. Google vs. The Establishment
Google, Inc. notched one substantial victory during the Survey period,
and it took a step closer to another milestone. In Viacom International
198. Id. at 1104.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1105-06.
201. Id. at 1106.
202. Id. at 1107.
203. Id. at 1110-11.
204. Id. at 1104.
205. Id. at 1106.
206. The Autodesk decision follows a trend toward stronger judicial enforcement of
EULA terms in software. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that the terms of the EULA for open-source software were enforceable and that
the defendant could be held liable for using the software in a way that exceeded the scope
of the terms); see also David L. McCombs, et al., Intellectual Property Law, 62 SMU L.
REV. 1291, 1311-12 (2010) (discussing Jacobsen).
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Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Google successfully argued that its YouTube web-
site was protected by the "safe harbor" provision of the DMCA.20 7 Also
during the Survey period, in what has come to be known as the "Google
Book Settlement," the company received preliminary judicial approval
for a groundbreaking settlement that clears the way for Google to digitize
and publish the contents of millions of books.20 8
Viacom pitted Google against several older media conglomerates. 20 9
Viacom argued that YouTube, which Google acquired in 2008 in a deal
worth $25 billion, must be liable for direct and secondary infringement
because YouTube continued to operate its video-sharing website despite
widespread copyright infringement by its users.210 YouTube responded
to the allegations by claiming that it was protected by the DMCA's safe
harbor provision.211 Under the DMCA, an internet service provider
(ISP) may be shielded from liability for the infringing activity of its
users.212 The ISP can lose its safe harbor status, however, if it does not
respond "expeditiously" to takedown notices from copyright holders. 213
The ISP can also lose the protection by operating despite actual knowl-
edge of infringement or in the absence of such knowledge, "by awareness
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. '214
Viacom argued that YouTube could not have been ignorant of its users'
widespread infringing use of the site and so could not enjoy protection
under the DMCA. 215 The Southern District of New York disagreed,
holding that "[m]ere knowledge of [the] prevalence of such [infringing]
activity in general is not enough. '216 A plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant ISP had "knowledge of specific and identifiable infringe-
ments of particular individual items" and failed to correct it.21 7 The court
granted YouTube's motion for summary judgment. The case is currently
on appeal to the Second Circuit.21 8
The Google Book Settlement resulted from a class action suit, brought
by the Authors' Guild and the Association of American Publishers, that
alleged that Google committed massive copyright infringement when it
scanned and digitized thousands of copyrighted books as part of its
207. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
208. See Supplemental Notice To Authors, Publishers and Other Book Rightsholders
about the Google Book Settlement, Attachment to Amended Settlement Agreement at
1-4, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-08136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov.13, 2009),
ECF No. 770 Ex. 1, available at http://static.googleusercontent.com/external-content/un-
trusted-dlcp/www.googlebooksettlement.com/en/us/int/en/Suppementa-Notice.pdf.
209. See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
210. Id. at 518-19.
211. Id. at 516.
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (m)-(n) (2006).
213. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
214. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
215. Id. at 517.
216. Id. at 523.
217. Id.
218. Notice of Appeal, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-02103-LLS
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010), ECF No. 402.
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"Google Books" initiative.219 Settlement negotiations began in 2006220
and in 2008 the agreement received initial approval from the Southern
District of New York. 221 That initial agreement required Google to pay
out $125 million to authors and publishers and set up a "Book Rights
Registry" to pay authors and publishers for the digital use and sale of
works.222 Consumers would be able to buy digital books outright or pay
per page, and Google would take thirty-seven percent of the revenue
with sixty-three percent going to copyright holders.223 Publishers and au-
thors could opt out of the program. 224
On November 19, 2009, the court approved an amended settlement
that added several new material terms.225 These included (1) the creation
of a fiduciary to hold payments due to "orphan works"-copyrighted
works for which the owner is unknown or cannot be contacted-until the
owner can be contacted; (2) a new revenue model, which gives Google a
greater ability to discount but also allows copyright holders to negotiate
their share of the revenue; and (3) a provision that limits the scope of the
agreement to foreign works that are registered with the U.S. Copyright
Office or are published in Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom. 226
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which along with several compet-
itors had objected to the 2008 settlement agreement over antitrust con-
cerns, also has objected to the most recent version as not doing enough to
resolve potential antitrust violations.227 The DOJ has urged the court to
send the parties back to the negotiating table to address these con-
cerns. 228 At the end of the Survey period, the court had not yet given
final approval of settlement agreement.
Critics have said that in Viacom and in the pending Book Settlement,
219. Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. et al. v. Google Inc., No. 06-CV-8136
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008). The proceeding combines the unresolved claims of authors and
book publishers as initially filed in two underlying actions: Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 20, 2005) (a class action filed by representative authors
and the Guild) and McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8881 (S.D.N.Y Oct.
19, 2005) (an action filed on behalf of five publishing companies).
220. Letter from Roy Blount Jr., President, Authors Guild, to Authors Guild Members
(Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/member-alert.
google.html.
221. Times Wire Services, Google copyright settlement OKd, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2008/nov/l18fbusines/Fi-briefsl8.S4.




225. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, The
Authors Guild, Inc. et al. v. Google Inc., No. 1:05-CV-08136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009);
see also "Google Books Settlement Agreement," available at http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/ agreement.
226. Amended Settlement Agreement, The Authors Guild, Inc. et al. v. Google Inc.,
No. 06-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009).
227. Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 1:05-CV-08136-DC
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010), ECF No. 922.
228. Id. at 25.
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Google has undermined traditional copyright.229 Yet Google consistently
emerges from these landmark skirmishes as a company that perhaps is
ahead of its time, but not so far ahead that the law could not accommo-
date its innovations. As a partial validation of Google's ambitious but
controversial Google Books project, numerous countries, including Nor-
way, are now undertaking initiatives to preserve their nations' books in
an immense digital library and make them accessible over the internet.230
If not for Google's controversial effort to do the same, the United States
would be years behind in this "digital library race. ' '2 31
IV. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. No FAITH IN THE TRINITY-THE COLLEGE NETWORK, INC. V.
MOORE EDUCATION PUBLISHERS, INC.
In The College Network, Inc. v. Moore Education Publishers, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit addressed the appropriate test for determining trademark
infringement liability in cases involving internet keyword search terms.232
Keyword cases often center on whether the sale or purchase of a trade-
mark as a keyword is "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act, 233 but
here, the case turned on whether a purchased keyword created a likeli-
hood of confusion under that Act.234 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's
verdict that the use of "The College Network" as a search engine
keyword did not amount to trademark infringement.235
The College Network (TCN) and Moore Educational Publishers
(MEP) published competing study guides for nursing students.236 TCN
sued MEP for trademark infringement after MEP purchased "The Col-
lege Network" as a search engine keyword that would trigger advertise-
ments for MEP products. 237 To succeed in its claim, TCN needed to
establish (1) that it owned a valid trademark in "The College Network,"
(2) that MEP used the mark "in commerce," (3) that use was likely to
cause confusion, and (4) that TCN suffered damages as a result of the
use. 238 Although the question of whether the sale of a keyword consti-
tutes "use in commerce" often is a hotly contested issue, the district
court's jury instructions assumed that element was satisfied. 239 The jury
229. See, e.g., Robert McCrum, Google's Publishing Free for All Undermines Our Liter-
ary Tradition, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 19, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
books/2010/sep/19/literature-google-publishing-threat-mccrum.
230. Natasha Singer, Playing Catch-Up in a Digital Library Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2011, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2Ol1/01/09/business/O9stream.html?src=
busln.
231. Id.
232. The College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. Publ'rs, Inc., 378 F. App'x 403, 414 (5th
Cir. May 12, 2010) (not designated for publication).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
234. College Network, 378 F. App'x at 414.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 405.





was asked to decide only two issues-whether "The College Network"
was TCN's valid trademark and whether MEP had infringed it.240 The
jury found that TCN did indeed own the valid mark, but on the question
of infringement, the jury answered in the negative. 24 1 The jury even
awarded $637,412 in damages to MEP, which had counter-sued TCN al-
leging tortious interference with contract and defamation.242
On appeal, TCN argued that the district court improperly assumed use
in commerce when the issue should have been submitted to the jury.243
TCN also argued that the great weight of the evidence pointed to a likeli-
hood of confusion, and thus the jury verdict should be set aside.2 44 In its
unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit vacated the tortious interference
award but otherwise upheld the jury verdict.245 The court found no need
to revisit the issue of use in commerce because the jury found no infringe-
ment even with instructions that assumed use in commerce.2 46 As to like-
lihood of confusion, the court adhered to the Fifth Circuit's usual eight
factor test to make the determination. 247 Notably, the court declined to
adopt the Ninth Circuit's so-called "Internet Trinity" test, which in e-
commerce trademark disputes emphasizes the factors of (1) "the similar-
ity of the marks," (2) the "relatedness of the goods and services," and (3)
"the parties' simultaneous use of the internet as a marketing channel. '248
In the Ninth Circuit, if the Internet Trinity factors point to a likelihood of
confusion, the other five factors must "weigh strongly against a likelihood
of confusion in order to avoid infringement. ' 24 9 The court explained that
the Fifth Circuit had not adopted the Ninth Circuit test in the past and
would not do so in this case.2 50 Besides, the court explained, the parties
had waived the likelihood of confusion issue by failing to object to the
jury instructions at trial. 251 The College Network underscores the impor-
tance of objecting to improper jury instructions and the difficulty in suc-




242. Id. at 410.
243. Id. at 413.
244. Id. at 413-14.
245. Id. at 414.
246. Id.
247. Id. The Fifth Circuit has set forth a "nonexhaustive" list of factors to consider
when determining likelihood of confusion. See Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty,
Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2009). These factors are: "(1) the type of trademark; (2)
mark similarity; (3) product similarity; (4) outlet and purchaser identity; (5) advertising
media identity; (6) defendant's intent; (7) actual confusion; and (8) care exercised by po-
tential purchasers." Id.
248. Id.; see also Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007)
(articulating the so-called "Internet Trinity" test).





B. REAL PROBLEMS FOR SELLERS OF FAKES-GuccI AMERICA, INC.
v. FRONTLINE PROCESSING CORP.
In Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., the high-end
handbag company brought an action against three credit card processing
companies.252 Gucci alleged that these companies infringed its marks by
providing credit card processing services to websites that openly sold
counterfeit Gucci products.2 53 The issue before the court was whether a
provider of services could be held liable for contributory trademark in-
fringement in the same way that a provider of goods can be.2 54 The dis-
trict court held that service providers can indeed be held liable and
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 255
This case followed on the heels of another in which Gucci prevailed in
a trademark infringement action against the operators of TheBagAddic-
tion.com, a website that sold replica Gucci products at a fraction of the
cost of the originals. 256 In this case, Gucci pursued an action against the
three credit card processing companies that provided or facilitated
merchant services for TheBagAddiction.com. 257 The district court for the
Southern District of New York rejected Gucci's claims of direct and vica-
rious liability, finding that the defendants did not use the mark in com-
merce and that the defendants lacked the partnership or agency
relationship required for vicarious infringement. 258 Gucci's only possible
claim was for contributory infringement.259
The district court applied the Inwood test for contributory infringe-
ment, as adapted by the Seventh Circuit for cases in which the alleged
contributing infringer is a service provider instead of a manufacturer. 260
That test requires that the defendant (1) intentionally induced another to
engage in trademark infringement or (2) supplied services with knowl-
edge of infringement or by willfully shutting its eyes to the infringing con-
duct while it had sufficient control over the instrumentality used to
infringe.261 The court found that Gucci had pleaded sufficient facts
against each of the defendants to survive the motion to dismiss. For one
of the defendants, a company that acted as liaison between TheBagAd-
diction.com and the other two defendants, the court found that Gucci
252. Gucci Amer., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
253. Id. at 237.
254. Id. at 240.
255. Id. at 253.
256. Id. at 236-37.
257. Id. at 236.
258. Id. at 246-47.
259. Id. at 247 ("Gucci's only plausible theory of liability here is contributory trade-
mark infringement.").
260. Id. at 247-48; see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 46 U.S. 844, 844
(1982); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49
(7th Cir. 1992) (adapting Inwood for case where alleged infringer provided services). The
Seventh Circuit's test added the "control" requirement to the second prong of the Inwood
test. See Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149-50.
261. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
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pled sufficient facts to establish that the defendant intentionally induced
others to engage in trademark infringement.2 62 For the other two defend-
ants, the court found that Gucci had made extensive factual allegations
about these defendants' knowledge of the infringing products.263 Criti-
cally, the court also found that because the website could not operate
without credit card servicing, the defendants essentially "controlled" the
corporation for the purposes of the modified Inwood test.264
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court was active, though not activist, during the Survey
period. Its decision in Bilski and its stalemate in Omega were not as dis-
ruptive to the business industry as many anticipated they would be, yet
the Court's actions provide some guidance for the future. In Muchnick,
the Court clarified the copyright registration requirement, though the de-
cision also leaves much for future courts to resolve. The Federal Circuit's
decisions in Forest Group and Brooks Brothers shook up traditional as-
sumptions about patent marking, and the courts or the legislature will be
dealing with the resulting tsunami of false marking claims in the near
term. The Federal Circuit also continued to be quite active in patent law
issues. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
decided at least two significant IP cases-Molecular Pathology and
Viacom-that will be closely followed on appeal, as well as Gucci, a deci-
sion that will be of great concern to those who facilitate the business
transactions of direct trademark infringers. The Fifth Circuit's decision in
MGE may be welcomed by anti-circumvention hackers, while the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Vernor will be mourned by those who peddle used
software. In summary, the Survey period was varied, interesting, and
complex, settling some longstanding IP law issues but raising a number of
others.
262. Id. at 248-49.
263. Id. at 249-50.
264. Id. at 251-52.
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